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Abstract The effectiveness of any law largely depends on the clarity of
legal provisions and the activity of their enforcement institutions. Secu-
rities law, which is inherently complex, must be unambiguous to be
properly applied. Judges and lawyers dealing with securities litigation
need to be trained properly to provide justice for the public. Laws gov-
erning initial public offerings in Bangladesh are ambiguous in many
respects, and the judiciary lacks judges and lawyers sufficiently experi-
enced in this area of law. As a result, judicial enforcement of disclosure
requirements in prospectuses appears to have been a difficult task. The
administrative enforcement of those requirements is not effective either.
In such a situation, potential investors remain market-shy keeping the
Bangladesh securities market moribund for years. This paper identifies
the drawbacks of the existing mechanism of judicial enforcement of
disclosure regime, and provides suggestions for their elimination.
I. Introduction
The Bangladesh Securities Market has passed 50 years of its opera-
tion but still remains in its infancy. The market has been witnessing a
serious lack of investor confidence since early 1997 following an un-
precedented share scam in 1996. The government has been striving in
vain to rejuvenate the ailing market by offering some pecuniary in-
centives to investors and issuers alike. As part of reforms accom-
plished thus far, the market watchdog imported the disclosure
philosophy from developed economies without any changes being
made in the prospectus liabilities and their enforcement regime. The
governmental efforts thus largely ignore the issue of investor protec-
tion and wrongly emphasize ‘investor attraction’ whilst numerous
studies1 reveal that the former is more crucial than the latter for the
1 For some of those studies, see R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes & A. Shleifer,
‘What Works in Securities Law’ (Oct 2002) http://post.economics.harvard.edu/
faculty/shleifer/papers.html (2 Dec 2002); R. La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A.
Shleifer & R. Vishny, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’ (2002) 57
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development of securities markets. As a result of such misplaced em-
phasis, the market, which is overly dominated by individual amateur
investors, has been moribund for years. In order to restore investor
confidence in the primary share market, both the existing legal provi-
sions attracting liabilities for flouting prospectus requirements and
their enforcement mechanism need to be reformed.
Law enforcement denotes the realization of the ends clearly stated
or inherent in a given law. The judicial enforcement of law refers to
the realization of those ends through the judiciary of a government.
The benefit of a particular law depends on either its voluntary com-
pliance, or its compulsory enforcement by competent authorities in an
efficient manner. An analysis of transition economies shows that the
effectiveness of legal institutions is much more important than the
quality of the law in the books.2 In other words, the quality of enforce-
ment is more crucial than the legal texts. The quality of law enforce-
ment refers to the efficacy of the judicial system in addressing the
violation of law.3 The effectiveness of any good law largely depends
on the efficacy of its enforcement institutions.4 A study of 49 countries
selected from different legal systems worldwide demonstrates that
effective law enforcement has a significant positive impact on the
number of initial public offerings (IPOs).5 The study concludes that
countries having a poor record of law enforcement are disadvantaged
in the development of their securities markets.6 In analysing the re-
cent corporate collapses in the United States (US) and Australia,
Tomasic advocates strengthening the enforcement of corporate law to
avoid future debacles.7 In reality, companies alone are unable to repli-
cate a good legal environment for investment mainly because of
agency problems, that is, the well recognised conflict of interests be-
tween the corporate management and corporate shareholders. Both
issuers and investors, therefore, depend on an efficient judicial system
to maintain a balance of interests between the ownership of a cor-
poration and its control.
Journal of Finance 1147; A. Shleifer & D. Wolfenzon, ‘Investor Protection and
Equity Markets’ (2002) 66 Journal of Financial Economics 3; R. La Porta, F. Lopez-
De-Silanes, A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate
Governance’ (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economics 3.
2 K. Pistor, M. Raiser & S. Gelfer, ‘Law and Finance in Transition Economies’ (2000)
8 Economics of Transition 325 at 356.
3 C. Leuz, D. Nanda & P. D. Wysocki, ‘Investor Protection and Earnings
Management: An International Comparison’ (Aug 2001) MIT Sloan School of
Management Working Paper No. 4225–01 at 28 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id = 281832 (20 Dec 2001).
4 K. Pistor, ‘The Standardisation of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies’
(2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 97 at 129.
5 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer & R. W. Vishny, ‘Legal Determinants
of External Finance’ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 1131 at 1143 and 1146.
6 Ibid. at 1149.
7 R. Tomasic, ‘Current Development and Notes: Corporate Collapse, Crime and
Governance- Enron, Andersen and Beyond’ (2002) 14 Australian Journal of
Corporate Law 1 at 55.
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The Disclosure-Based Regulation (BDR) relies on ex post litigation
instead of the ex ante prevention of the issuance of a defective pro-
spectus. In a disclosure regime, judicial enforcement is crucial to pro-
tect investors from the misfeasance of other participants in the
process of an IPO. It has been argued that issuers may find it reward-
ing to raise capital from the market following the historic lack of the
enforcement of prospectus liabilities.8 In practice, this has been hap-
pening in the Bangladesh IPO market.9 The situation is so depressing
that aggrieved investors submitted a memorandum to the Prime Min-
ister describing the malpractice of issuers in raising corporate funds
from the IPO market by using false and misleading information in
their prospectuses.10 Commenting on the situation in Bangladesh, the
most prominent securities lawyer in the country pointed out that the
enforcement of law is very loose and once the investors become vic-
tims of any defective prospectus, it would be difficult for them to avail
themselves of the remedies.11 The comments come true from the fact
that none of the cases filed by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) has been finally disposed of as yet.12
Clarity in the law of its purpose and purview, and the efficiency and
honesty of the enforcement institutions are essential for the enforce-
ment of any law. In respect of prospectus regulation, both are criti-
cally absent in Bangladesh. A recent study reveals that outdated laws
and ineffective enforcement of existing laws are largely responsible
for the non-participation of institutional investors in the Bangladesh
securities market.13 The judiciary suffers from a serious lack of public
confidence.14 Most of the violations of securities laws go without judi-
cial remedy and such unfettered violations result in a severe lack of
investor confidence in the market for IPOs.
An empirical study suggests that the protection of investors is the
central goal of the enforcement of securities laws.15 Except for self-
8 G. Golding, ‘Underwriters Liability in Australian Securities Offerings’ (1993) 11
Company and Securities Law Journal 401 at 404.
9 For details, see Shahnewaz & H. J. Hoky, ‘Share Scandal: 15 Writ Petitions
Pending’ The Daily Jugantor, Dhaka (17 Aug 2002).
10 H. J. Hoky, ‘Prime Minister’s Interference Urged to Stop Irregularities of Listed
Companies: Investor Submitted Memorandum’ The Daily Jugantor, Dhaka (6 Nov
2002).
11 M. Zahir, Company and Securities Laws (University Press Limited: Dhaka, 2000) at
130.
12 H. Mahmud, ‘The Regulatory Body in Question: SEC Runs Slow in Dealing with
Cases Against Persons Involved in the Share Scam’ The Prothom Alo, Dhaka (5
Jul 2004).
13 Z. Haque, ‘The Capital Market and Its Problems’ The New Nation, Dhaka (9 Jun
2000).
14 See, for details, M. Islam and S. M. Solaiman, ‘Public Confidence Crisis in the
Judiciary and Judicial Accountability in Bangladesh’ 13 Journal of Judicial
Administration (2003) 29–60.
15 For details, see R. Tomasic, ‘Corporations Law Enforcement Strategies in
Australia: The Influence of Professional, Corporate and Bureaucratic Cultures’
(1993) 3 Australian Journal of Corporate Law at 192–229.
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regulation, securities laws are usually enforced by two separate agen-
cies, namely courts and government regulators.16 The flaws that exist
in the judiciary appear to have significant negative impacts on the
disposal of securities cases in the country. This paper aims to examine
aspects of the judicial enforcement of disclosure requirements in
Bangladesh. It concludes, that the present judicial enforcement of the
disclosure regime in Bangladesh is ineffective to protect investors in
the IPO market and reforms in the existing regime are imperative. A
securities market cannot be developed without honest and efficient
courts.17
II. Courts Dealing with Securities Cases in Bangladesh
Currently several ordinary courts deal with cases under securities
law.
i. A brief overview of the present courts system in Bangladesh
The courts in Bangladesh are constitutionally divided into two broad
hierarchies which include the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (Su-
preme Court) and the subordinate courts.18 The Supreme Court is
located in Dhaka, the capital city, whilst subordinate courts are in
operation across the country based on administrative units. The Su-
preme Court is functionally separated from the executive, but, the
executive and judicial functions are not completely separated at the
lower judiciary. Magistrates are entrusted with the responsibility for
adjudicating certain criminal cases specified in Schedule II of the
Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (CrPC 98) in addition to their admin-
istrative functions. The magistrates exercising judicial functions are
constitutionally required to be controlled (in terms of posting, promo-
tion and grant of leave) by the President in consultation with the
Supreme Court.19 In practice, the executive alone controls those mag-
istrates. In several cases the Supreme Court has strongly asserted that
controlling the magistracy by the executive without consulting the
Supreme Court is unconstitutional.20 Despite this, the executive con-
tinues to exercise its powers, weakening the fair exercise of judicial
powers by the magistrates.
The courts are divided into two main categories: civil and criminal,
with some additional courts and tribunals of special jurisdictions at
16 J. W. Hicks, ‘Securities Regulation: Challenges in the Decades Ahead’ (1993) 68
Indiana Law Journal 791 at 802.
17 B. Black, ‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Stock Markets: The
Nontriviality of Securities Law’ in Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective
(Paris: OECD 2001) 82.
18 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, Arts 94 & 114.
19 Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, Art 116.
20 Aftabuddin v Bangladesh (1996) 48 DLR 1; Rahman v Shahiduddin (1999) BLD 291;
Secretary, Ministry of Finance v Hossain (2000) 52 DLR (AD) 82.
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various levels. These special courts have no jurisdiction over securi-
ties cases. The existing ordinary courts are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
ii. Need for an independent and experienced judiciary for the
adjudication of securities litigation
An independent and impartial judiciary is a cornerstone of justice.
Providing justice under a particular law requires a clear understand-
ing of it. Securities law literature is complex and technical and is not
easily understood.21 Special training and experience are necessary to
deal with the complex cases. Weak judicial enforcement is therefore
considered to be the most ‘deceptive’ impediment to the implementa-
tion of corporate laws.22 If a judge lacks adequate knowledge, effi-
ciency, integrity and honesty, it may result in miscarriage of justice.
21 J. H. Lorie, P. Dodd & M. H. Kimpton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence
(2nd edn) (Dow Jones-Irwin: Illinois, 1985) at viii; E. T. McDermott, ‘Defining
Manipulations in Commodities Futures Trading: The Futures “Squeeze”’ (1979) 74
North-Western University Law Review 202 at 205.
22 B. Black & R. Kraakman, ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’ (1996) 109
Harvard Law Review 1911 at 1926.
Figure 1 Hierarchy of ordinary civil courts
Supreme Court of Bangladesh
High Court Division Appellate Division







Court of Assistant Judge
*Arrows indicate appeals
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This may hinder justice in various ways, the most important of which
are described below.
(a) The law under which remedies have been sought may be un-
clear and ambiguous when identifying the persons who are
liable for the contravention in question. A judge may dishon-
estly interpret such a vague law in a manner which gives ad-
vantage to the defendants or accused.
(b) A law may have shortcomings in explicitly proscribing the dis-
puted conduct of the defendants. If such a legal lacuna exists, a
judge may afford an interpretation of the law with an intention
to acquit the violators.
(c) The remedies available in the legislation may not have been
explicitly defined and judges may have a wide discretion to
decide on the extent of penalties. In such a case, judges may
adopt the minimalist approach and impose the lowest penalty
allowed by law.
Figure 2 Hierarchy of ordinary criminal courts
Supreme Court of Bangladesh
High Court Division Appellate Division
















Magistrate of the Second Class
Magistrate of the Third Class
*Arrows indicate appeals
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(d) Inefficient case management by judges causes delay in the de-
livery of judgments. The disposal of the most significant cases
may be delayed due to the backlog of ordinary cases. But a
judge who is efficient in case management may give precedence
to those cases, the disposal of which has considerable impacts
on the securities market.
(e) Judicial corruption may deprive the victims of justice. In civil
cases, the victims may be deprived of compensation for their
loss or damage resulting from their investment in a defective
prospectus whilst in criminal cases, corruption may influence
the acquittal of the violators of securities laws.
(f) Corrupt judges may purposely appoint dishonest people to
carry out investigations into certain cases. These investigations
may significantly harm the merits of those cases.
(g) In an adversarial system of trial, lawyers have an important role
to play in the administration of justice. Experienced lawyers
may assist the court in interpreting the securities law by pre-
senting juristic arguments and citing the case law of other juris-
dictions wherever appropriate. The lack of experienced lawyers
dealing with securities laws deprives the bench of the assis-
tance of the bar in disposing of securities cases.
(h) Dishonest public prosecutors or lawyers may take money from
both parties in a particular case and may refrain from playing
their due roles against the wrongdoers during the hearing of
the case.
Taking these implications of dishonest and inefficient judiciary for
the administration of justice into account, it is obvious it that the
existence and operation of a judiciary free from all such flaws is
needed for an effective investor protection regime in the IPO market.
Honesty of the judges in Bangladesh
Unlike other officials, judges are expected to have ‘special technical
education’ and intellectual expertise, as well as exceptionally high
moral standards.23 A person having impeccable integrity can demon-
strate personal independence which is a findamental requirement for
the administration of justice. However, institutional independence is
equally important. A lack of judicial independence be it personal or
institutional erodes public confidence in the judiciary. These require-
ments are essential for building this confidence which is regarded as
the main impetus for the administration of justice.24 Referring to the
continual erosion of this confidence, a recently retired Chief Justice of
23 M. L. Volcansek, Judicial Misconduct: A Cross-National Comparison (Florida:
University Press of Florida, 1996) 131.
24 S. Shetreet, ‘Judicial Accountability: A Comparative Analysis of the Models and
the Recent Trends’ (1986) 11 International Legal Practitioner 38 at 39.
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Bangladesh observed that the country’s judiciary is losing the con-
fidence of the common people that it once enjoyed.25
The higher judiciary is closely involved in maintaining discipline in
the subordinate courts. In Khatoon v State of Bihar, it was observed in
India that in a hierarchical judiciary, the higher courts usually control
subordinate courts to avoid deviations from the higher standard of
judicial behaviour, preventing damage to public confidence in the
judiciary.26 In Bangladesh, the HCD is empowered to supervize and
regulate the subordinate courts under Article 109 of the Constitution.
But the honesty of Supreme Court judges has been questioned on
several occasions in recent years. For example, Mr Latifur Rahman, a
judge of the HCD, has been found guilty of engaging in a telephone
conversation with General Ershad, a former President who was in-
volved in the Janata Tower graft case. During that conversation, the
judge was reportedly offered a bribe. The judge replied that he would
consider the case sympathetically.
In May 2002, Mr N K Chakavarty, a judge of the HCD, had to
relinquish his position when the Chief Justice refused to reappoint
him following allegations of corruption.27
The recent removal of a HCD judge reinforces the truth of allega-
tions of corruption practised by judges. On 20 April 2004, Justice Syed
Shahidur Rahman was removed for taking a bribe and fixing bail for
an accused.28
Apart from the above allegations against judges of higher judiciary,
the dishonesty of the judges of lower judiciary has contributed enor-
mously to the erosion of public confidence in courts. A survey con-
ducted by Transparency International Bangladesh showed that 88.5
per cent of households agreed that it is almost impossible to get quick
and fair judgment from courts without money and influence. The
survey also revealed that 63 per cent of the households who are in-
volved in litigation had to pay bribes to the court officials.29 Another
survey conducted by Transparency International Canada revealed
that 97 per cent of households think that the judiciary is corrupt.30
Recently, the Law Minister himself publicly posed the question: why
should the people keep their confidence in the judiciary? The Minister
asserted that corruption has infiltrated the judiciary.31 Recognizing
the truth of the assertion, Justice Mostafa Kamal, a former Chief
25 A. K. F. Huq, ‘Judiciary Is the Last Pillar of Our Hope’ The Independent, Dhaka (20
Dec 2001).
26 (1979) Cr L J 1045.
27 Z. Ahsan, ‘Political Preference in Appointment of Judges Alleged’ The Daily Star,
Dhaka (26 May 2002).
28 ‘High Court Judge Removed for Taking Bribe’ The New Age, Dhaka (21 Apr 2004).
29 Transparency International Bangladesh, Corruption in Bangladesh Surveys: An
Overview’ http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/docs/survey/overview.htm (22 Jun 2002).
30 Transparency International Canada, ‘Corruption in Bangladesh: An Overview’
http://www.transparency.ca/Readings/TI-F01.htm (22 Jun 2002).
31 ‘Infiltration of Corruption into Judges Cannot be Denied’ The Daily Jugantor,
Dhaka (21 Aug 2002).
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Justice, opined that ‘[c]orruption has entered the judiciary and open
discussion on corruption in the judiciary should not be stopped in the
name of contempt of court’.32
Recent events have also demonstrated unhappiness with the judici-
ary. The Bar Association recently protested against the appointment
of a judge (equivalent to a district judge) to a labour court, because of
his alleged corruption in his previous workplace.33 In another case,
many colourful posters were put up across the district against the
District and Sessions Judge alleging widespread corruption by the
judge.34 The local Bar Association supported the allegation and also
blamed some lawyers for collaborating with the judge.35 Supporting
these impressions of corruption, the US State Department Report
2001 on Bangladesh also notes that criminals have not been punished,
because of corruption among the judges of the lower courts.36 The US
State Department also reiterated in its country reports for 2002 and
2003 that the lower judiciary ‘suffered from corruption’.37 Over the
last few years, the tenure of a number of judges of subordinate courts
have been dismissed or terminated on the grounds of corruption.38
Although an honest judiciary is fundamental to provide investors
with meaningful remedies against their grievance,39 the above discus-
sion demonstrates the lack of such judiciary in Bangladesh.
Independence of the judiciary
The lower courts are the courts of first instance in trying securities
cases. There are strong allegations that the lower judiciary in Bangla-
desh is impeded in functioning independently because of the direct
influence of the executive. The executive frequently interferes with the
32 ‘Contempt Law Should Not Bar Open Discussion on Corruption in Judiciary’ The
Independent, Dhaka (19 Oct 2002).
33 The Chittagong District Bar Association protested the appointment of Mr Abdur
Rashid Mian to the First Labour Court of Chittagong. For further details, see ‘Ctg
Lawyers Boycott First Labour Court’ The Independent, Dhaka (9 Sept 2002).
34 ‘Posters on the Walls against the District and Sessions Judge of Sariotpur’ The
Daily Janakantha, Dhaka (23 Sept 2002).
35 ‘Lawyers to Boycott Court at Sariatpur from Today’ The Daily Star, Dhaka (16 Nov
2002).
36 US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in
Bangladesh, (4 March 2002) at 11; http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ris/hrrpt/2001/sa/
8224.htm (10 Apr 2002).
37 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in Bangladesh 2002 (31 March 2003),
US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18309.htm (17
Dec 2003); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in Bangladesh 2003 (25
February 2004), US Department of State http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2003/27944.htm (29 Aug 2004)
38 For example, Mr S M Badrul Islam was dismissed from his office of a Joint
District Judge of Dhaka in July 2000, after the charge of misconduct and
corruption was proved against him: Ministry of Law, Justice and parliamentary
Affairs, Justice Section – 3, Order No Justice–3/1–D–5/95, 17 July 2000.
39 Black (2001) above n17 at 64.
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judiciary in defiance of Articles 109,115,116 and 116A of the Constitu-
tion.40 Because of this, Justice Kamal argues that the Bangladesh judi-
ciary will not be acceptable at home and abroad unless it is separated
from the executive.41
The separation of judiciary from the executive has become one of
the few issues on which national consensus has been achieved. In
December 1999, the AD in Secretary, Ministry of Finance v Hossain
issued a 12-point directive for the virtual separation of the judiciary
from the executive.42 The court directed the executive to implement
the verdict within a stipulated time. Unfortunately, the executive did
not implement the rulings, except for the one which dealt with finan-
cial remuneration for the judiciary. Instead of enforcing the landmark
verdict, the executive has sought and obtained the 20 extensions.
Thereafter the Court refused to grant further time and expressed
dissatisfaction at the progress towards the implementation of its
directives.43 The directives are yet to be implemented.44
Such a subservient judiciary has failed to keep up the view that the
‘Court being a vehicle, a medium or mechanism devised by the Con-
stitution for the exercise of the judicial power of the people on behalf
of the people, people will always remain a focal point of concern’ of
the court in performing its functions as observed by the Supreme
Court in Farooq v Government of Bangladesh.45 As a result, the judici-
ary has been the subject of continually diminishing public confidence.
A 2002 survey revealed that 92 per cent of households are not satisfied
with the present judicial service.46 The Chief Justice publicly conceded
that the entire judiciary is now under more scrutiny than ever
before.47
The Bangladesh judiciary is not independent: it is under the control
of the executive. Procrastination in relation to separating the judiciary
and the executive casts a considerable doubt as to the bona fide inten-
tion of the Government to foster an impartial and independent judici-
ary. A subservient judiciary is unhelpful for the enforcement of the
disclosure regime. Independence of the judiciary is crucial for securi-
ties cases which involve wealthy and politically prominent individuals,
who are in a position to use political influence. The judiciary can delay
a particular trial by initiating miscellaneous petitions without genuine
40 US Department of State (2002) above n. 36 at 1, see also the judgments of the
cases referred to in above n. 20.
41 ‘Contempt Law’ (2002) above n. 32.
42 (2000) 52 DLR (AD) 82.
43 ‘Separation of Judiciary: SC Irked by Govt Plea for Repeated Time’ The Daily Star,
Dhaka (10 Nov 2004).
44 ‘Still Playing Around with HC Directives!’ Editorial, The Daily Star, Dhaka (19 Jan
2005)
45 (1997) 49 DLR (AD) 1 at 15.
46 The World Bank in collaboration with others conducted the survey: see ‘Survey
on Quality of Service Delivery: Only 2pc Urbanites Satisfied with Police’ The New
Nation, Dhaka (24 May 2002).
47 ‘Work with Honesty: CJ Asks Lawyers’ The Independent, Dhaka (5 Nov 2002).
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grounds as has occurred in the share scam cases of 1997. The judicial
role in dealing with the cases implies a ‘disregard’ for the law. In
support of this view, the Law Minister in a public statement said that
‘. . . in our country there is a tendency of ignoring the law; especially
those who are powerful in society who prefer to remain above the
law’.48
For the effective enforcement of the disclosure regime, the institu-
tional independence and personal honesty of the courts have to be
ensured. Considering the urgency of judicial independence in Bangla-
desh, the World Bank Country Director reiterated the need for a
judiciary effectively separated from the executive branch of the gov-
ernment.49 Similarly, the September 2002 report of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) submitted that separation of the judi-
ciary should be effected.50 Separation of the judiciary has become
long overdue. But the executive is very reluctant to lose its influence
over the judiciary—as a result, separation remains elusive.
iii. Experience of judges in dealing with securities litigation
Education and training are two prerequisites which are imperative for
achieving efficiency in any profession. A formal legal education is not
compulsory for a person wanting to be a magistrate: a law degree is
not a requirement even for a position of the judge of the Supreme
Court.51 However, law graduates are appointed as the judges of the
courts of assistant judge, the lowest courts of the civil justice system.
Apart from the lack of a law degree, judges in general lack proper
training. A UNDP study reveals that 80 per cent of judges and magis-
trates think that judicial officers should receive proper training to
improve their efficiency.52 The judges and magistrates are of the view
that they do not have sufficient law books and that this situation
should be remedied.53 The UNDP study further shows that over the
last 65 years (from 1931 to 1996) the efficiency of the courts has
deteriorated to a significantly low level in Bangladesh.54 A former
president of the National Lawyers’ Association commented that a
shortage of trained lawyers and judges has left the judiciary in a
vulnerable situation. He strongly asserted that ‘[t]here was a very
good judicial system even under the British Colony, but now we don’t
48 ‘Poor Governance, Corruption Cost Country Very Dearly: WB Country Director
Tells Workshop in City’ The Independent, Dhaka (15 Oct 2002).
49 Ibid.
50 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Security in Bangladesh: In
Search of Justice and Dignity (2002) Dhaka: UNDP at 77.
51 See Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, Art 95.
52 UNDP (2002) above n. 50 at 76.
53 Ibid.
54 A. T. R. Rahman, ‘Human Security in Bangladesh: In Search of Justice and
Dignity—A Commentary’ The Bangladesh Observer, Dhaka (16 Oct 2002).
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have that situation because we are missing properly educated,
trained, honest lawyers and judges’.55
The above assertion mirrors the need for the education and train-
ing of judges to deal effectively with the cases under ‘ordinary’ law.
Securities law constitutes a relatively new and special branch of law
and this needs a special and sophisticated consideration of all the
relevant facts. Therefore, the judiciary needs to be experienced in the
adjudication of complex securities issues in a timely way.56
A serious scarcity of case law regarding the violation of disclosure
requirements implies that judges lack practical experience when deal-
ing with cases under prospectus liabilities. Despite numerous allega-
tions of violations of disclosure provisions, violators have not been
sued or prosecuted on many occasions.57 There has been only one
major judicial decision in relation to the securities law to date. This
decision just clarifies ‘the preliminary procedure to be followed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission’ (SEC) before lodging a crimi-
nal case under the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 (SEO 69).
A lack of experience might have led the judge of the lower court to
arrive at the wrong decision which was overturned by the Supreme
Court.58 This general lack of case law indicates that the practice of the
judicial enforcement of securities laws is a relatively new or rare
phenomenon in Bangladesh. Neither the bench nor the bar is experi-
enced in handling securities cases because they hardly ever come
before the courts. These weaknesses are unfavourable to investor
protection in the IPO market.
IV. Bars Dealing with Securities Litigation
i. Need for trained and experienced lawyers
As an integral part of the judicial system, an honest and efficient Bar
is a fundamental requirement for the enforcement of securities law.59
So far, no law schools in the country teach securities law. Only the
business schools and schools of economics include the study of secu-
rities markets on their curricula, and they teach the subject from the
perspective of business and economics. Very few lawyers, however,
55 ‘Contempt Law’ (2002) above n. 32..
56 See Tomasic (1993) above n. 15 at 225–26.
57 For some recent instances of alleged violations, see M. S. Rahman, ‘AIMS Backs
Down on Pledge to Underwrite Modern Food: Audited Accounts Differ from
Prospectus Statement’ The Daily Star, Dhaka (3 Jul 2000); T. I. Khalidi, ‘IPO to
Raise Tk 5 cr by Taiwanese Tiles Producers: Fu-Wang Conceals Information’ The
Daily Star, Dhaka (11 Feb 1998); M. S. Rahman, ‘SEC Suspends Raspit IPO, Orders
Special Audits: Auditor to be Selected by the Company’ The Daily Star, Dhaka (15
Sep 2000); M. S. Rahman, ‘Alleged Tax Evasion by Keya: SEC May Ask Co to
Issue Public Notice’ The Daily Star, Dhaka (15 Jun 2001). Examples are too many
to be mentioned due to space constraints.
58 For details, see Shinepukur Holding v Securities and Exchange Commission (1998)
18 BLD (AD) 189.
59 See Black (2001) above n. 17.
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have studied securities law overseas as part of their postgraduate
course work programmes, and the majority of these have completed
their courses on securities law in recent years. To the best of the
writer’s knowledge, no lawyers in Bangladesh have a degree or
diploma exclusively in securities regulation.
Company law, on the other hand, partly deals with the disclosure
requirements and prospectus liabilities. But even this is not taught
extensively in any law school in the country. Company law, in most
cases, is a part of a single subject designed to cover all mercantile or
business laws. The law schools teach company law without emphasiz-
ing its importance in relation to the securities market. Law graduates
in Bangladesh have little opportunity to carry out an in-depth study of
company law unless they undertake a research degree. More impor-
tantly, no academics in the country presently have a higher degree in
either companies or securities laws. Perhaps, this lack of interest in
the field has ensured that securities laws remain unfamiliar to law
students. Lawyers in Bangladesh are likely to be lacking critical
knowledge of securities law.
ii. Honesty in legal profession
The honesty of the Bar is crucial, especially in a common law jurisdic-
tion which follows the adversarial system of trial. Recently, the role of
lawyers has been the subject of public criticism. A survey by Trans-
parency International Bangladesh shows that 16.3 per cent of house-
holds pay bribes to the opponents’ lawyers.60 The UNDP study
mentioned earlier finds that a total of 70 per cent of the victims of
crime are reluctant to seek remedies because of their concern about
giving money to the public prosecutors who are legally paid by the
Government.61 Further, not all victims who initiate legal actions
against offenders can continue with their cases. The UNDP study also
mentions that a total of 52 per cent of litigants are reluctant to proceed
with their cases due to the demand by lawyers for money in the name
of the courts (bribes to be given to the courts) in addition to their
fees.62 In recent times, a new device of dishonest practice by lawyers
has been unearthed. Some lawyers have reportedly forged the sig-
natures of some judges of the Supreme Court and prepared fake bail
orders to release their clients (convicts) from jails.63 The extent of the
lawyers’ dishonesty seems to have caused public concern and
prompted the Chief Justice to advise the lawyers to work with utmost
honesty and sincerity to avert further erosion of public confidence.64
60 Transparency International—Bangladesh (2002) above n. 29.
61 UNDP (2002) above n. 50 at 70.
62 Ibid.
63 ‘Law-breaker Lawyer: Colleague Beaten for Freeing Convict on Bail Using Fake
Documents’ The Daily Star, Dhaka (13 Jun 2002). See also, ‘Another Incident of
Forgery for Bail from the High Court’ The Daily Jugantor, Dhaka (26 Aug 2002).
64 ‘Work with Honesty’ (2002) above n. 47.
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The honesty of prosecutors is always emphasized to establish suc-
cessful prosecutions. Referring to the unbecoming role of the prose-
cutors, the Law Minister publicly asserted that the appointment
procedure for prosecutors is not transparent and their appointments
are largely based on political consideration.65 This implies that the
present role of public prosecutors is not conducive to the fair admini-
stration of justice.
It would be difficult for the bench to administer justice without the
honest, prudent and sincere cooperation of the bar. Lawyers are very
much involved in the judicial system. Litigants depend on their law-
yers to contest their case. A fiduciary relation exists between lawyers
and their clients. The honesty of lawyers is essential for the benefit of
their clients and to build up public confidence in the legal profession.
Any deviation from the proper conduct of their role impairs their
credibility with the public.
The Bangladesh Bar Council, the sole statutory regulatory body for
lawyers, should take the necessary steps to ensure discipline in the
legal profession. This can be achieved through transparency and ac-
countability in the profession. The ethical conduct of lawyers has to be
maintained in the interest of investor protection in the IPO market.
IV. Delay in the Delivery of Justice and the Public
Confidence Crisis in the Judiciary
The right to a quick trial is guaranteed under Article 35(3) of the
Constitution as a fundamental right in Bangladesh. But chronic delay
has become synonymous with injustice and is a major systemic flaw in
the justice system. Nearly one million cases were pending in different
courts across the country as of June 2002.66 To give an indication of
the extent of the problem, the Law Minister argues that at the present
rate, the existing courts would take as many as 86 years to dispose of
these cases, even if no new cases are taken into account.67
Many cases have been pending for more than a decade. For exam-
ple, in the State v Deputy Commissioner of Shatkhira, the HCD held
that the detention of a minor boy, was illegal after he had spent 12
years in jail, suffering unspeakable inhuman treatment through no
fault of his own, but because of mala fide action of some interested
persons and administrative negligence of the Government.68 This is
not unusual in Bangladesh. A young man obtained bail from the court
after serving 19 years in prison without any trial and no charge was
65 ‘Now the People More Cautiously Watch the Judiciary, Don’t Destroy Confidence:
Chief Justice’ The Daily Jugantor, Dhaka (18 Aug 2002).
66 ‘Pending Cases Now Stand at 968,305: Settlement Will Need 86 Years’ The
Independent, Dhaka (1 Nov 2002).
67 ‘Traditional Litigation System Is Not Properly Responsive to Needs of People: CJ’
The Financial Express, Dhaka (1 Nov 2002).
68 (1993) 45 DLR 643.
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made against him until his bail hearing.69 In another case, a person
arrested on mere suspicion, without any specific allegation against
him, was released after 23 years in jail without any trial. He managed
to get released with the help of a human rights organization, which
instituted a compensation suit on his behalf. The court took two years
to decide the case and finally ordered compensation on 6 July 2002.
He died on 7 May 2001.70 Given such situations, a member of the Law
Commission of Bangladesh observed that ‘[p]raying for justice, the
parties become part of a long, protracted and tortuous process, not
knowing when it will end’.71
Delay in delivering justice is one of the elements which contributes
to the erosion of public confidence in the judiciary. In Daswani v HPA
International, the Indian Supreme Court expressed the view that a
‘long delay in delivery of the judgment gives rise to unnecessary
speculation in the minds of the parties to a case’.72 In a landmark
decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Rai v State of Bihar, Sethi J
strongly asserted that ‘Whereas justice delayed is justice denied, jus-
tice withheld is even worse than that’.73
A retired judge observes from his prolonged experience working
with the judiciary in Bangladesh, that ‘[d]elayed justice is the means of
inflicting injustice through the judicial system’.74 Justice Naimuddin
Ahmed, a member of the Law Commission, further observed that
‘[l]ike many other fields, values of the judges have also eroded. It is for
them that the pending cases are being piled up . . .’.75
The Law Minister, a veteran lawyer, finds judges and lawyers to be
equally responsible for the delay in the disposal of cases. He argues
that ‘the lawyers often seek time without any valid reason’ and the
judges grant their requests resulting in an inordinate delay in the
delivery of justice generally.76
The examples discussed above tend to support the proposition that
the chronic delay in the disposal of cases in Bangladesh has created a
‘deadlock’ in the administration of justice. The UNDP report reveals
that 70 per cent of the victims of the violation of law are reluctant to
seek legal remedies due to the uncertainty of the completion of trial.77
More alarmingly, law enforcers themselves would normally attempt to
69 Z. Hossain, ‘One and a Half Thousand Forgotten Detainees in Dhaka Jail’ The
Prothom Alo, Dhaka (3 Feb 2002).
70 See ‘The Daily Star Dialogue on Arrest and Police Remand’ The Daily Star, Dhaka
(23 Jun 2002).
71 M. S. Alam, ‘A Possible Way out of Backlog in Our Judiciary’ The Daily Star,
Dhaka (16 Apr 2000).
72 [2000] 1 LRI 686 at para. 3 (per V. N. Khare J) & AIR (2000) SC 775.
73 AIR (2001) SCW 2833 quoted in K. Singh, ‘Delay in Pronouncing the Judgment’
(2002) 89 All India Reporter 128 at 129.
74 M. Z. Islam, ‘Delay in Justice Delivery’ The Daily Star, Dhaka (25 Aug 2002).
75 ‘Rule on Retired Judge’ The New Nation, Dhaka (28 Nov 2000).
76 ‘Contempt Law’ (2002) above n. 32.
77 UNDP (2002) above n. 61.
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shift the blame for their failure to maintain public order to the judici-
ary. The survey also states that 100 per cent of police personnel think
that delay in the trial procedure is a cause of the lack of public con-
fidence in the law-enforcing agency.78 The problem has a considerable
harmful effect on the securities litigation, and thereby on the IPO
market in Bangladesh.
V. State of Judicial Enforcement of Securities Litigation
Reports concerning securities litigation filed by and against the SEC
since 1995 show that the filing of such cases began in 1997. Following
the share scam of 1996, the SEC in early 1997 lodged a total of 15
cases on the basis of the report of the inquiry into the share scam. Up
to 30 June 1998, there had been a total of 17 cases including the 15
mentioned above.79 The number of cases had reached 52 by June
1999.80 Because of the disposal of some minor cases, the number of
cases pending decreased to 43 in June 2000,81 but increased to 54 in
June 2001.82 As of June 2004, a total of 100 cases were pending in
various courts.83
Over the years, only some minor cases, for example, a certificate
case for the recovery of penalty imposed by the SEC, have been
disposed of. To date, none of the above-mentioned 15 sensational
scam cases has been finally adjudicated. Investors who lost their
money during the 1996 share scam are still waiting for the penalties to
be imposed on those responsible. Failure to convict and impose penal-
ties on the offenders is regarded as one of the main reasons for the
lack of public confidence in the market. Disposal of these cases is so
important for the interest of the market that the SEC is in favour of
disposing of the cases ‘whatever be the judgments’.84 No one can
appreciate this assertion by the SEC, because it is the complainant of
the cases. The regulator should have a firm commitment to win court
verdicts that penalize the violators of securities law. It should be noted
that merely disposing of the cases would not help restore investor
confidence in the market. The situation may well be worsened if the
real criminals are not punished. Having regard to the damaging effect
of such court decisions on the public, the SEC should vigorously
pursue and seek to punish offenders who have fraudulently taken
78 Ibid.
79 SEC, Annual Report 1997–1998, Dhaka at 49–50.
80 SEC, Annual Report 1998–1999, Dhaka at 98.
81 SEC, Annual Report 1999–2000, Dhaka at 47.
82 SEC, Annual Report 2000–2001 Dhaka at 34.
83 SEC, SEC Quarterly Review, (Apr–Jun 2004), Dhaka at 20.
84 D. N. Saha, ‘Hundred Days’ Progress of the SEC: Audio-Visual Recording of
AGMs, Quick Disposal of Cases Get Prominence’ The Independent, Dhaka (19 Jan
2002).
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away the life savings of investors and extensively damaged the securi-
ties market.
For the development of the market, the SEC has vowed on several
occasions to dispose of the pending cases in a short time. The Chit-
tagong Stock Exchange formally urged the Government to dispose of
these cases quickly.85 In a sense, the whole nation has been waiting to
see the judgments of the scam cases ‘where thousands of small and
first-time investors lost their shirts’.86 Despite an extreme erosion of
public confidence in the market as well as in the judiciary, the pace of
legal recourse against the violators of the securities law is very slow.
The tardiness is evident from the following account of judicial treat-
ment of the cases.
i. The incidents of the share scam cases
On 2 April 1997, executive director of the SEC lodged reports under
s. 25 of the SEO 69 with the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court
(CMM) Dhaka based on the report of inquiry.87 The reports filed by
the SEC executive director were basically the extracts of the report of
inquiry.88 The allegation against the accused was the contravention of
s. 17 of the SEO 69 which prohibits, inter alia, fraudulent acts in
relation to securities trading. Section 24 of the SEO 69 provides for
penalties for flouting s. 17. The CMM immediately took cognizance of
the offence under s. 24 of the SEO 69. Fifteen criminal cases were
registered against some 42 high-profile people in 15 listed companies.
The CMM directed the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused.
To avoid being arrested, the accused moved to the HCD on 3 April
1997 and obtained anticipatory bail, and then filed a criminal revision
petition in the court of sessions, Dhaka, under ss. 435 and 439A of the
CrPC 98. In the petition, the accused sought to set aside the order of the
CMM. On 1 June 1997, the sessions judge found that the person who
filed the reports to the CMM was not legally authorized to do so. He,
therefore, made a reference to the HCD under s. 438 of the CrPC 98 for
quashing the proceedings against the petitioners (the accused). The
basis of this argument was that the SEC chairman alone, without any
85 ‘CSE Urges Reform of Capital Market’ The Independent, Dhaka (21 Mar 2002).
86 ‘Emerging Stockmarkets: Revenge of the Innocents’ The Economist (12–18 Apr
1997) at 74. See also ‘The Bangladesh Stock Market: Slaughter of the Innocents’
The Economist (7–13 Dec 1996) at 90–91.
87 Section 25 of the SEO 69 provides that no court shall take cognisance of any
offence punishable under the Ordinance except on the report in writing of the
facts constituting the offence by an officer authorised by the SEC. In fulfillment of
this requirement, the executive director of the SEC filed the reports to the CMM
court concerning the facts of the fraudulent acts, etc. allegedly committed by the
accused of those cases.
88 Shinepukur Holding Ltd v Securities and Exchange Commission (1998) 18 BLD 61
at 62.
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resolution of the Commission, advised the director to file the reports.
The judge argued that the SEC chairman did not have the authority to
empower the director to go to the court and that the decision to file
the reports should have been made in a meeting of the Commission.
The judge also asserted that the warrant of arrest against the accused
rather than the summons was contrary to the law of criminal
procedure.
On 9 December 1997, the HCD rejected the reference made by the
sessions judge and upheld the decision of the CMM in relation to
taking cognizance of and the issuing of the warrant of arrest.89 The
accused afterwards lodged leave-to-appeal petitions with the AD, and
on 13 May 1998 the AD dismissed all the petitions and reaffirmed the
decision of the CMM.90 It took more than a year just to settle the
maintainability of the 15 scam cases which are still pending. Whatever
may be the reasons for the erroneous decision of the sessions judge
(be it inexperience or influence etc.), it has just added to the backlog of
securities cases. Special measures need to be considered to reduce the
complexities associated with the trial of securities cases.
VI. Special Court for Securities Cases
The previous discussion of the judiciary of Bangladesh suggests that
the existing courts and Bars are generally inexperienced in dealing
with securities cases. However, it is practically impossible to impart
sufficient education and training to the members of the whole judici-
ary overnight. Nor is it possible for the judiciary to gather experience
in respect of securities cases without the availability of a sufficient
number of cases. There also exists a culture amongst the victims of the
violation of the securities law to avoid courts for some plausible rea-
sons as discussed earlier. In a situation of public confidence crisis,
reliance on the existing courts for the efficient disposal of cases in-
volving prospectus liabilities would be impractical. Nevertheless, the
efficient judicial settlement of securities cases is such a vital issue that
it cannot be compromised.91 Moreover, emphasizing the need for
proper courts, an empirical study argues that the first step for the
development of securities market can be, inter alia, setting up honest
courts.92 Similarly, it is also argued that ‘[a] specialised court is ideal’
89 Ibid. at 3.
90 Ibid. at 195.
91 See M. Gillen & P. Potter, ‘The Convergence of Securities Laws and Implications
for Developing Securities Markets’ (1998) 24 North Carolina Journal of
International Law & Commercial Regulation 83 at 123–24.
92 B. S. Black, ‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets’ (2001) 48 UCLA Law Review 781 at 848.
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for the enforcement of securities law.93 Another study shows that
judicial enforcement contributes to developing securities markets
only in countries that have an efficient judiciary.94 The establishment
of special courts or tribunals is therefore needed in Bangladesh hav-
ing regard to the importance of a quick, fair and efficient administra-
tion of prospectus cases.
At present, there are a number of special courts in operation. For
example, Financial Loan Courts, and Speedy Trial Courts. All of those
courts were established with a common objective which is said to be
ensuring expeditious trial. The special courts have significantly con-
tributed to expediting the trial of cases under their respective jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, another type of special court may be established for
the trial of securities cases with judges who should be, inter alia,
trained in securities law. Alternatively, the purpose of efficient and
expeditious trials of such cases could have been served by establish-
ing a separate bench in the existing court system. But such a recom-
mendation would seem to be unworkable since the existing lower
courts including the Courts of District and Sessions Judges operate in
a system of a single bench with a single judge. Establishing separate
securities courts as courts of first instance is a necessity which has
been lately recognized by the SEC as well as the Minister concerned.95
Initially, these courts could be set up in Dhaka and Chittagong, where
the country’s two stock exchanges are situated.
In the establishment of special courts for securities cases, some
important concerns, such as the honesty and efficiency of the judici-
ary, are to be taken into account to avoid the problems that persist in
the existing ordinary courts. In addressing the regulation of financial
markets, a theory of incomplete law says that laws are ‘intrinsically
incomplete’. They argue that lawmakers cannot see, a priori, all future
contingencies.96 Because of this incompleteness of law, the judges
need to find out the complementary provisions of a given law for its
optimal enforcement. In addition, the complexities of securities cases
call for an honest and efficient dealing with them as has been can-
vassed before. An honest and sophisticated judiciary is taken for
granted in developed countries, but they are often partly or wholly
non-existent in developing countries.97 In view of the incompleteness
of law, complex nature of securities cases, and the urgency of their
93 Black (2001) above n. 39.
94 La Porta et al (Oct 2002) above n. 1 at 35.
95 H. J. Hokey, ‘Special Tribunal for Expeditious Trials of 53 Securities Cases
Including Share Scam’,
The Daily Jugantor, Dhaka (23 June 2003).
96 For details, see K. Pistor & C. Xu, ‘Incomplete Law: A Conceptual and Analytical
Framework and Its Application to the Evolution of Financial Market Regulation’
(2002) Social Science Research Network at 88; http:ssrn.com (15 Sept 2002).
97 Black (2001) above n. 39.
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speedy disposals, there is a good argument for the provision of spe-
cialized courts for securities.98
ii. Composition of the Securities Courts
As indicated earlier, the composition of Securities Courts requires the
consideration of special characteristics of securities cases. The char-
acteristics are: firstly, the ‘complex, contradictory and confusing’ na-
ture of the cases;99 secondly, the involvement of huge amounts of
money; and thirdly, the power of the violators in terms of money and
political influence. The consideration of these issues becomes more
important when the courts are seen to be inefficient and corrupt.
Money can play a prejudicial role in the trial procedure of securities
cases if the courts lack honesty and integrity. Taking the above fea-
tures of securities cases and the persistence of corruption in the judi-
ciary into account, the judges of the securities courts should be
appointed from amongst the persons not below the rank of a District
and Sessions Judge.100 These judges should be conversant with the
securities law of the country as well as the relevant case law of the
leading common law jurisdictions. Leading jurisdictions in this regard
refer to those countries where significant development of securities
laws has taken place as well as the neighbouring countries. In this
respect, the judges should have access to the relevant case law of,
inter alia, the US, the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Canada, Ma-
laysia and India, to enrich their knowledge of the proper application
of securities laws. Special training should be arranged for those
judges who are not adequately trained in securities laws.
iii. Jurisdictions
The legislation creating the securities courts should clearly define the
jurisdictions of the courts. The courts should have both civil and
criminal jurisdictions. These will be the courts of first instance for all
securities cases irrespective of the amounts of money involved in a
case. The courts should be empowered to work out the highest com-
pensation and penalties in all cases brought before them as provided
in the applicable laws. For the sake of justice, the courts should also
have powers to grant injunctive relief where necessary. However,
apart from the judicial enforcement, the SEC, as well as self-
regulators, will settle those disputes which fall within the ambits of
their respective authorities.
98 Ibid.
99 See E. T. McDermott, ‘Defining Manipulation in Commodities Futures Trading:
The Futures “Squeeze”’ (1979) 74 Northwestern University Law Review 202 at 205.
100 District Judges are the most senior judicial officers in the lower judiciary. Thus
these judges are more experienced than others as judges of courts of first
instance. In addition, it is generally considered that these judges are relatively
honest as compared with their junior colleagues.
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
248
iv. Trial procedure and timeframe
The securities courts will follow the existing ordinary laws which are
appropriate in adjudication procedures. However, the concept of
‘speedy trials’ should be applied in the adjudication of all cases, with
the exceptions of ‘hard cases’ where more time is required.
The courts may be primarily given 120 days from the date of filing a
case to the delivery of judgment. Subject to reasonable grounds, the
Chief Justice of Bangladesh may extend the time limit for another 30
days. Finally, in ‘hard cases’, the Chief Justice may grant a further
extension of 30 days. If the court in any circumstances failed to dis-
pose of a given case within the above stipulations for any reason
whatsoever, the case should be transferred to the special bench of the
HCD (discussed below) without delay. The HCD would hear such
‘hard’ cases under its existing statutory original jurisdiction over
company matters. However, pertinent laws may be amended in line
with this proposal. The special bench should deliver its judgment
within 45 days from the date of the transfer of the cases from the trial
courts.
v. Appeal against the judgments of the securities courts
A bench of the HCD is recommended to be designated for the pur-
pose of securities cases. An appeal may be made against the judgment
of the securities courts to this bench of the HCD within 30 days from
the date of the delivery of judgment.101 The judges of this bench
should be sufficiently trained in securities law. At an early stage,
judges for the special bench for securities cases could be selected
from the HCD on the basis of some specific criteria. These criteria
may include, inter alia, their knowledge of securities law, a good per-
formance record to ensure professional efficiency, personal integrity
and honesty. There should also be a specific time limit for the HCD
like the court of first instance, say 45 days from the date of filing an
appeal.
Appeals shall lie, subject to the leave of the court, to the AD against
the judgments of the HCD. The decisions of the AD should be final. An
appeal to the AD could be allowed within 30 days from the date of the
judgment of the HCD. The AD would be required to deliver its final
judgment 45 days from the date of lodging the appeal.
These might seem to be exceptional provisions for the settlement of
securities cases in such a short period. In practice, it is quite
possible—this is evident from some recent judgments under some
ordinary, as well as special laws of the country.102
101 A 30-day period is a standard time for filing appeal in the courts in Bangladesh.
102 For example, the performance report of the Speedy Trial Courts established in
early 2002 shows that in the first six months (April–September 2002), the courts
disposed of 548 cases out of a total of 909 registered cases within 60 days in
compliance with the Act: The Daily Janakanth, Dhaka (21 Sept 2002). Further, the
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vi. Ensuring independence and accountability of the judges of the
securities courts
It is, of course, difficult to ensure the independence and integrity of
judges, but not unattainable. Judicial independence largely depends
on the attitude of the executive branch of the government. First of all,
the executive must have a firm commitment that it will not interfere
with the functions of the courts. At the same time, the Government
should be sincere in restraining judicial corruption. On the other
hand, the personal determination of the judges appointed to the secu-
rities courts to ignore all irrelevant factors and to work independently
with utmost honesty in dealing with securities cases is equally
important.
Judicial independence is, indeed, essential to the dispensation of
justice. But in reality, independence itself is not a panacea for justice.
A recent trend is that the accountability of judges has significant
implications for the balance between the judicial independence and
impartial justice. In this regard, Shetreet strongly argued that ‘[j]udi-
cial independence cannot be maintained without judicial accountabil-
ity for failure, errors or misconduct’.103 Despite the importance of
accountability, it is beyond the scope of this article to work out a
method for judicial accountability that can be applied in Bangladesh.
However, to ensure judicial honesty in the enforcement of securities
laws, some mechanisms may be suggested. These are:
• the periodic disclosure of assets owned by the judges;
• the disclosure of a judge’s interests in the case on trial if there
are any;
• subjecting judges to a number of sanctions which involve dis-
ciplinary action including dismissal as well as penal sanctions.104
In addition to the proposed measures applicable to all judges, some
specific actions should be considered for the judges who will fail to
conclude a trial within the stipulated time limits without plausible
reasons. For example, the failure of a judge to deliver a verdict within
the stipulated timeframe should entail a departmental investigation
into the functions of the judge in relation to the given case. Under
Article 109 of the Bangladesh Constitution, the HCD is entitled to
carry out such investigations. Depending on the investigation report,
disciplinary action should be initiated against the judge if a significant
lack of honesty, sincerity and deliberate inefficiency is proved. Actions
under ordinary municipal law should be taken if a dishonest practice
is found in the investigation.
trials of the Shihab murder case and the Trisha murder case have been completed
in 27 and 59 working days respectively from the date of framing charges (74 days
from the date of occurrence): ‘Judgment of Trisha Murder Case’ The Daily
Janakantha, Dhaka (3 Oct 2002) editorial.
103 Shetreet (1986) above, n. 24 at 38.
104 Gillen et al. (1998) above, n. 91.
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As regards the accountability of the special bench of the HCD, the
judges should be accountable to the Chief Justice. If the Chief Justice
deems it necessary, the existing Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) may
conduct an investigation into the apparent reasons for delay at the
bench of the HCD.105
As a mechanism of investor protection, the above suggestions aim
to deliver justice to the victims of the violation of securities laws
through competent courts in the true sense. It is submitted that if
these suggestions are implemented, at least an acceptable level of
efficiency, independence and honesty in the administration of justice
in securities cases can be achieved.
VIII. Civil Suits by the Securities Regulator on Behalf of
Investors
The SEC is not entitled to sue the violators of disclosure requirements
for the recovery of loss or damage sustained by the investors on the
one hand, and individual investors are generally either unable or re-
luctant to sue the wrongdoers on the other.106 As a result, innocent
retail investors remain uncompensated and wrongdoers go unpun-
ished. Until recently, this was the case in the neighbouring countries
of India and Malaysia. But they have already legally empowered their
respective securities regulators to sue the wrongdoers for investors’
compensation.107
There are good reasons for discouraging the filing of large amount
of private litigation (litigation by individual investors) in emerging
markets.108 One of the major problems for the enforcement of civil
liabilities in such markets has been the considerable weakness of the
judiciary.109 The civil courts lack trained judges and lawyers leading to
high costs of private litigation. The other negative aspect is that cor-
porate governance in emerging markets is so weak that minority
shareholders do not have a basis on which to sue the corporate
wrongdoers.110 Having regard to these impediments, it is suggested
that shareholders avoid civil litigation. The market in Bangladesh is a
105 Under Article 96(3) of the Bangladesh Constitution 1972, the Supreme Judicial
Council (SJC) is a permanent body which consists of the CJ and two other next
senior judges of the AD. One of the primary functions of the SJC is to inquire into
the capacity and conduct about the allegations levelled against any judge of the
Supreme Court.
106 Currently, there are no provisions for class actions in securities law in
Bangladesh.
107 See for India, Companies (Amendment) Act 2000 s. 16 and Companies Act 1956
s. 62; for Malaysia Securities Commission Act 1993 s. 155(1) and Policies and
Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities 1999.
108 P. A. Wellons, ‘Prototypes of Securities Regulation for Africa: Key Issues’ Harvard
Law School, CAER II Discussion Paper No. 47 (1999) (CD-ROM)(2000) at 53 (PDF).
109 Ibid.
110 Wellons (2000) above n. 108.
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pre-emerging one where the above impediments are stronger as com-
pared with many emerging markets. The inability and passivity of
investors in suing wrongdoers are evident from the fact that after the
market crash in 1996, the SEC filed only the criminal cases against the
offenders, the investors themselves could not afford to lodge civil
suits.
In developed markets, institutional investors usually play a signifi-
cant role in enforcing the securities law. Wellons contends that it may
be ‘very inappropriate’ to rely on the retail shareholders to enforce
the law in an emerging or pre-emerging market which lacks ‘the
institutions to support private litigation’.111 He also argues that the
reliance of a regulator on investors to file private litigation ‘recognizes
that the securities regulator lacks the resources to police all securities
markets itself’.112 The lack of regulatory powers to sue the wrong-
doers on behalf of the investors is therefore regarded as a weakness
of the securities regulator.
Finding a negative impact on the market from another point of
view, Grundfest advocated the curtailment of civil suits by investors.
He proposed that suits discourage people from investing in securi-
ties.113 However, Seligman refuted the Grundfest’s arguments and ar-
gued, inter alia, that ‘[p]rivate litigation performs a significant role in
maintenance of investor confidence by enforcing the mandatory dis-
closure system’.114 In response, Grundfest again defended his views
and countered Seligman’s arguments to justify the reduction of pri-
vate litigation in relation to securities trading.115 In the wake of such a
debate in the US, both the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the courts rapidly focused on the proposition that ‘private securities
litigation poses a serious problem’.116 When responding to the per-
ceived threats to the securities market,117 US Congress enacted the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1995 to restrict the use of
class actions.118 In doing so, ‘Congress concluded that too many
shareholders’ suits were designed to blackmail the issuing companies
111 Ibid at 40. In this respect, the term ‘institutions’ refers to, inter alia, institutional
investors.
112 Ibid at 50.
113 For details, see J. A. Grundfest, ‘Disimplying Private Rights of Actions Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority’ (1994) 107 Harvard Law
Review 963.
114 J. Seligman, ‘The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s
‘Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission’s Authority’ (1994) 108 Harvard Law Review 438 at 440.
115 For details, see J. A. Grundfest, ‘Why Disimply?’ (1995) 108 Harvard Law Review
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into settling out of court’.119 In many countries, private civil suits
concerning securities trading are unusual. For example, there is an
extremely low private litigation rate in Japan.120 Even in the UK, there
is reluctance to provide investors with the right to private action.121
The above discussion on the practice of private litigation shows
relying on investors to recover their loss by themselves is a regulatory
weakness. The practice of commencing large number of court actions
is detrimental to the market on two counts. First, it discourages inves-
tors from investing in securities; and secondly, the large numbers
of litigation impose a considerable expense on the issuing company. A
company belongs to the shareholders and any expenses of the com-
pany in turn concern the investors. The SEC should take responsi-
bility for bringing the violators of disclosure requirements to justice
and recovering compensation for investors. A proactive regulatory
approach will foster better investor protection in the IPO market in
Bangladesh.
VIII. Summary and Conclusion
Protection of investors requires strengthening their legal rights and
enforcing these properly.122 The judiciary is the guardian of people’s
rights and ‘courts play a central role in corporate governance’ which
primarily aims to protect external shareholders.123 Despite the para-
mount importance of the enforcement of the legal rights of investors,
enforcement records are very poor in Bangladesh. Many reasons have
been identified for the trend of inaction against the violators of dis-
closure requirements. These are: a lack of experienced, efficient and
honest judiciary; the erosion of public confidence in the present
courts and Bars; chronic delays in the justice system; and a lack of
regulatory powers to institute civil suits on behalf of investors.
It has been argued that it would be difficult to eradicate the above
weaknesses from the existing court system. Establishing separate
courts for securities cases has been suggested as a solution to the
problems.
Although the operation of separate courts is not a popular practice,
a ‘different national context’ requires a different securities law re-
gime.124 Some of the important factors that necessitate special meas-
ures are: the goals of securities law; the level of sophistication of
securities markets and related institutions; the level of sophistication
119 Wellons (2000) above n. 108 at 52.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 S. Johnson, ‘Coase and the Reforms of Securities Market’ (2002) 16 International
Economic Journal 1 at 11; La Porta et al. (2000) above n. 1 at 15.
123 J. R. Macey, ‘Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: Articles & Comments;
Courts and Corporations: A Comment on Coffee’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review
1692 at 1694.
124 See Black et al. (1996) above n. 22 at 1920–29.
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and credibility of legal institutions.125 These aspects of national con-
text for the variation of corporate or securities laws support the spe-
cial judicial enforcement of law in the interest of the securities market
in Bangladesh. The situation also calls for a strong protective ap-
proach to investors.
Generally speaking, the maximization of profits of the firm is the
central goal of corporate law from the economic point of view. But the
corporate law of emerging markets ‘must address a broader set of
goals’.126 In emerging economies, corporate law should provide more
investor protection, as compared to that provided in the developed
economies.127 The arguments for more protective measures in emerg-
ing or pre-emerging markets are based on the prevalence of special
characteristics of those markets. These characteristics are the severity
of informational asymmetries, less operational and economic effi-
ciency of the markets because of the lack of standard professional
services, the problematic enforcement procedure of law due to the
weakness of courts and the paucity of experienced market partici-
pants.128 Admittedly, all these characteristics exist in the Bangladesh
IPO market. In addition to the above shortcomings, there are some
other concerns about the judiciary.
In view of the present situation, the establishment of special securi-
ties courts is long overdue for the sake of justice in securities cases.
However, simply establishing the courts will not be sufficient to
address the problems. To facilitate the effective operation of the pro-
posed courts, increased accountability of judges is essential, other-
wise the proposed special courts will be engulfed in old problems
which have necessitated the introduction of special mechanism for the
judicial settlement of securities litigation. In Bangladesh, the practice
of judicial accountability to protect the judiciary itself from the public
confidence crisis is long overdue. More than ever before, the judiciary
has in recent times lost its credibility to the public. In terms of the
judiciary, public confidence should be considered to be an end in
itself, whilst accountability can be seen as a means to that end.129 The
arguments for the separate courts also rely on the need for independ-
ent and impartial judicial decisions. Judges must be independent be-
cause an independent judiciary is essential for the effective judicial
enforcement of securities laws.130
Lawyers are an integral part of the administration of justice. A need
for special measures has been argued to ensure the ethical and pro-
fessional conduct of lawyers. Central to these measures is the need for
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the systemic regulation of lawyers by the existing statutory body and
their respective associations. Imparting adequate legal education and
training to the lawyers is also crucial.
Investors are either reluctant or unable to go to court for judicial
remedies. As a result, the wrongdoers care little about flouting the
law. Empowering the SEC to sue the violators of prospectus civil
liabilities is an important issue for investor protection. Referring to
several other jurisdictions, it has been argued that leaving the respon-
sibility for the enforcement of civil liabilities with the investor alone is
a regulatory weakness. The paucity of litigation, despite the allega-
tions of the violations of civil liabilities, proves that asking investors
who lose their meagre savings in the market to bring the wrongdoers
to book is completely futile in Bangladesh. In response to similar
circumstances, India and Malaysia have already amended their legis-
lation to empower their securities regulators for the recovery of inves-
tors’ loss or damage.
The enforcement of civil liabilities will not be sufficient to deter the
offenders. Criminal liabilities should also be enforced with due em-
phasis. Recent cases in the UK and the US have precipitated a public
demand for more vigorous enforcement of securities law. The people
in these countries want greater use of criminal sanctions, with special
emphasis on imprisonment.131 Similar to civil liabilities, the impor-
tance of the enforcement of prospectus criminal liabilities also entails
the operation of competent and efficient courts to penalize the offend-
ers in the securities market.
Good laws and efficient courts minimize the unfair benefits to cor-
porate managers and maximize the return to the external sharehold-
ers. The efficient judicial enforcement of securities laws provides
investor protection and thus increases the availability of external eq-
uity finance essential for the development of securities markets.132 The
present judicial enforcement of prospectus liability has proved to be
ineffective to protect investors in the IPO market in Bangladesh. In
addition to judicial enforcement, the administrative enforcement of
the securities law is a complementary mechanism to the whole en-
forcement regime. The issues of administrative enforcement may be
the topic of another effort.
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